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Abstract. Security as an enabling paradigm has not succeeded half as well
as we might have hoped. Systems are broken or breakable, and users (people)
have something of a lack of faith, understanding, or patience with security
measures that exist. Whilst secure systems and solutions are the backbone of
a working interconnected system of systems, they are not people-oriented, and
they are oftentimes arcane enough to have an air of ‘security theatre’ about
them. We can also assume that they will continue to grow in both complexity
and application if we continue as we are in our arms race.
To answer what we perceive to be a problem here, we are working on the
integration of socio-psychological notions of trust into computational systems
where it makes sense (both human- and system-facing). This work includes
the development of our Device Comfort paradigm and architecture, wherein
mobile devices and nodes in infrastructures have a embedded notion of comfort
that they can use to reason about their use, behaviour, and users. This notion,
contextually integrated with the environment the device is in, aids in decision
making with regard to, for instance, information ﬂow, security posture, and
user-oriented advice. Most importantly, the notion embeds trust reasoning
and communication into the device, with which the user can be aided to un-
derstand situation, risk, and actions by device, infrastructure, and themselves
- which we call Foreground Trust, after Dwyer. We conjecture that comfort
and foreground trust both enhance security for devices and increase the under-
standing of security for the user, through use of human-comprehensible and
anthropomorphic concepts. In this paper, we discuss some security problems,
address the misnomer of trusted computing, and present an overview of com-
fort and foreground trust. Finally, we briely present our ten commandments
for trust-reasoning models such as those contained within Device Comfort, in
the hope that they are of some use in security also.
1. Introduction
We live in a complex world, one in which decisions about security of many kinds
occupy an important place. For as long as there have been people, these decisions
have been important. The diﬀerence between ten, a hundred, or a thousand years
ago and now is the tools we use. Like any power tool, computers, either desktop,
laptop, or in our pockets, help us to do things more quickly. They also help put us
into diﬃcult situations more quickly. Information power tools, which is what com-
puters are, have potentially exposed their users’ information - private, heretofore
shared only with a chosen few, to the many. Protecting this information, as well as
the tools themselves and the access they have to others’ tools and information, is
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the task of information security. Attacking the information, for pleasure or proﬁt,
is the ‘task’ of the ‘adversary.’
We have reached an unfortunate stage in the evolution of information systems,
however - we conjecture that, if a system is not compromised it most certainly
can be, and that the attacks are coming faster and most importantly in unique
ways - while we still have the worms and viruses of the past, we now have to
contend with social engineering and targeted attacks. To do this, we pour more
and more intellectual capital into defences against the adversaries. But to what
end? Systems now not compromised can be, and many are, with or without our
knowledge. Couple this with the increasing complexity of the defences themselves,
which ultimately results in more frustration at the very least on the part of the
users we are trying to defend, and we arrive at a challenging confusion: the system
is broken. An arms race has been carrying on for many years, and the only loser is
the person who wants to get her job done, or play.
Enhanced security mechanisms, better passwords, diﬀerent kinds of passwords,
more complex login procedures, more demands on users, or abrogation of responsi-
bility are not the answers at least, they’re not the answers that make for security
with users in mind. We ﬁnd a little solace in usable security, but ultimately we
feel that we should look for a more human-centric approach to security. To achieve
this, we approach the problem from the point of view of human social norms, in
particular, ion our work, trust and comfort, and their darker siblings distrust an
discomfort. In fact, these are topics we have been dealing with for some time
in diﬀerent areas, including agent systems and critical infrastructures. They lend
themselves particularly well to human-oriented security because they are in essence
human-oriented security - and they have worked for humans for millennia. The
paradigm that most interests us in this instance is what Dwyer [4] calls Foreground
Trust - in essence the ability of technological devices to present information to
users in order to allow them to make security-focused (trust-focused) decisions.
Our most recent work in this area has been concerned with integrating comfort and
trust reasoning techniques into mobile devices, which we call Device Comfort.
This paper discusses the Device Comfort paradigm as a security tool for both
information and personal security from a high level perspective (interested readers
can ﬁnd more information in other work [11]). As well, we will discuss a set of
‘commandments’ for trust and comfort facing the user, commandments that we
feel can beneﬁt any security technology where humans are a concern (and this is, of
course, all of them). The next section introduces and brieﬂy discusses Foreground
Trust, before we proceed to a slightly more in depth discussion of Device Comfort
as a form of Foreground Trust in section 3. Section 4 takes the form of a discourse
on presenting information to the user, and is an extension of work we did in [9].
After a discussion and a brief look at ongoing work in Device Comfort in section 5
we conclude in section 6.
2. Foreground Trust and Related Work
Trust Enablement was presented in [4], where it was applied to the task of
the system to connect people through technology by giving them the tools and
information they need to make trusting decisions regarding other people. Extended
to Foreground Trust, it was further expounded upon in [13]. The basic premise
of Foreground Trust is this: if people have enough information to make trusting
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decisions, they will do so. We acknowledge that there is, of course, rather a lot of
trust placed in the person in this instance, which we will address with regard to
information security in the next section. However, the premise is inherently sound
- people ‘get’ trust, they understand it in a very deep sense, and it is a tool that
has evolved over millennia to allow humans to make decisions or handle complexity
in the face of risk [2, 6, 3, 7, 12].
Extending the concept of Foreground Trust to a human-technology relationship
is a necessary next step in evolving a security solution that is human-oriented. In
some settings this should be closely integrated with societal behaviours and norms.
Work by Murayama et al on the Japanese concept of Anshin is closely related work
in this area [5, 14]. In [1] we ﬁnd behavioural history based reputations to inform
security decisions in networks, and also the outlook that one entity’s view of the
network is its own when it comes to security; and that this ‘personal’ view (i.e.
local reputation of other entities) is more important than the global view.
The beneﬁts of this approach are manifest: humans, as has already been noted,
understand trust, and they understand how trust decisions are made. Integrating
these decisions into the interface between human and ‘security’ is, we conjecture, a
sensible approach to allow the human to understand the security risks and resultant
posture of the systems they are using to get their work done. Ultimately, the Device
Comfort paradigm is an extension of trust reasoning into mobile devices that are
inherently human-facing.
3. Device Comfort
Device Comfort extends trust reasoning technologies by allowing mobile devices
to reason with and about computational trust [7] and to communicate these reason-
ings to the owner of the device in a human-oriented manner. The Device Comfort
paradigm goes further in that it allows the device itself to make trust-based deci-
sions, comfort-based decisions, and policy-based decisions independent of the user,
and adjust its security posture accordingly. We have written extensively about De-
vice Comfort elsewhere [8, 10, 11] and so only brieﬂy discuss the notion here as it
applies to a non-traditional security measure.
Device Comfort was initially envisaged as a tool to help teens using smartphones
make more sensible decisions about what they are using the phones for (in partic-
ular, with regard to the phenomenon of Sexting). However, we quickly became
aware that the paradigm had applicability in many diﬀerent uses of mobile devices
for many diﬀerent users, and have altered our outlook accordingly.
The premise of Device Comfort is quite simple: to Advise, Encourage, and Warn
(as for a constitutional monarch, in fact) and ultimately be able to proscribe actions
for the users of the mobile device (call it AEWP). Indeed, we’d go as far as claiming
that this is what all security methodologies and tools should be doing. It does this
by using the strengths of the device as a sensing mechanism, as well as having
inbuilt security policies. Device comfort is a dynamic phenomenon the more sense-
capabilities a device has the more we can integrate into comfort. Currently we see
Device Comfort as a measure based on reasoning about the following:
• The user’s identity
• Enhanced trust reasoning about the user, and the ongoing relationship with
respect to trust that the device has in the user (and/or owner);
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• The current task (for instance, making a call, sending text, sending pictures,
email, etc.)
• The current location (which virtually all mobile devices can determine with
some accuracy)
• A Comfort Policy-base (provided by the owner of the device, as well as
the owners of any information the device stores or can access, basically
presented to the device, and thus the user, on access.)
A more formal exposition is given in [11]. We see Comfort as a dynamic, context-
based reasoning mechanism. The internal architecture of the technology is based on
sensing tools communicating with a comfort agent via tuple spaces, and the agent
communicating with the user through a sensible interface. We have very carefully
considered how the mechanism becomes human-oriented through the interface, both
as what we call ‘annoying technology’ [11] and as an embodiment of the AEWP
concept. We aim, through the interface to give the user second thoughts, encourage
anticipatory regret if possible, and learn from what the device can tell them about
the situations they ﬁnd themselves in - and in this way, to learn about security for
themselves and their information.
3.1. The Human Security Posture. Because Device Comfort was devised as
a tool to allow potentially less-aware (or less concerned) users to make sensible
risk-based decisions, it is unique in that it is human-oriented as well as seeking to
allow humans to understand their context not only for information security, but
also for personal security. It is possible to envisage situations where the device
is ‘uncomfortable’ because of aspects of its physical context location, electronic
neighbourhood (what devices are present), and so on, as well as its electronic con-
text, including policies. In these instances, it is useful to present these aspects of
context to the user as something that they should be concerned about and want
to change, because they themselves may be at risk, and not just the device of the
information on it (and so: “leave the area” is a valid comfort response, for instance,
as is “don’t send that message from here”). In essence, the tool has a use in the
formation of ‘second thoughts’ for users in risky situations [13]. Whilst we have not
as yet conducted experiments involving this aspect of Device Comfort, we hope to
be able to address it in the near future.
4. The Ten Commandments of Foreground Trust for Security
In [9] we presented a discussion of the complexity of trust models that are, as
all should be, human-focused. The arguments there are similar to those in this
paper: too much complexity is not helpful, for instance. We did, at that time, have
eight commandments for trust models. In this paper, we extend this to ten (there
should always be ten, after all) with the addition of two commandments which were
discussed as a result of that previous work. We also extend the commandments
to take into account security models and techniques, in the hope that they can be
more generally applied. We make no claim to uniqueness in these commandments
- indeed we would be heartily surprised if they were not in some shape or form
discussed elsewhere in the usable security world. But we do claim that they are
useful to bear in mind in the trust world too, an they are most certainly applicable
in any case. The commandments, and a brief discussion, follow.
(1) The model is for people.
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(2) The model should be understandable, not just by mathematics professors,
but by the people who are expected to use and make decisions with or from
it.
(3) Allow for monitoring and intervention. Humans weigh trust and risk in
ways that cannot be fully predicted. A human needs to be able to make
the judgement, especially when the model is in doubt.
(4) The model should not fail silently, but should prompt for and expect input
on failure or uncertainty.
(5) The model should allow for a deep level of conﬁguration. Trust and security
models should not assume what is ‘best’ for the user. Only the user can
make that call.
(6) The model should allow for querying: a user may want to know more about
a system or a context.
(7) The model should cater for diﬀerent time priorities. In some cases, a
trust/security decision does need to be made quickly. But in other cases, a
speedy response is not necessary
(8) The model should allow for incompleteness. Many models aim to provide
a deﬁnitive answer. Human life is rarely like that. A more appropriate
approach is to keep the case open; allowing for new developments, users to
change their minds, and for situations to be re-visited.
(9) Trust (and security) is an ongoing relationship that changes over time. Do
not assume that the context in which the user is situated today will be
identical tomorrow.
(10) It is important to acknowledge risk up front (which is what all trust, in-
cluding Foreground Trust, does).
5. Discussion and Ongoing Work
The commandments translate into design principles guiding the creation of a
Comfort Device that negotiates trust, security and control on behalf of and in
conjunction with the user. Knowledge about how the user would want to operate
such a device is necessary. We are working on a series of research questions to
inform our design perspective. For instance, we argue that there are some trust
decisions that the user is more interested in than others. But how do we distinguish
between these interactions? Catering for interactions will diﬀer depending on users
needs and interests. Other questions include how users diﬀer amongst themselves
between what is the priority in an interaction.
The intricacies of an interface are also relevant for a successful project. What
graphic style is suitable? With what sort of language does the user want to be
informed of risk in the beginning of an interaction? Formal? Colloquial? Although
these questions might seem to be those that need to be addressed at the later stage of
delivery or even trivial, in actuality such considerations shape how users approach
issues of security and trust. Are users welcomed to consider these complicated
notions on their own terms or alienated?
It should be clear that, in all cases systems such as those outlined here have a
need for a solid foundation. Security, in the sense of a secure system (as secure
as we may be able to make it, and at as low a level as possible), is necessary,
but not suﬃcient to bring about the needed interactions and relationships that the
system must have with the user, and vice versa. Ultimately, trust and comfort
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serve to make security more ﬂexible. The major diﬀerence between traditional
security and trust/comfort is the way in which risk is handled: security, including
trusted computing, aims to minimize or eliminate risk if possible, resulting in a
so-called ‘trusted’ system. Ironically, given that trust is founded upon risk, this
process would if possible reach the situation where trust was in fact not needed.
Trust and comfort acknowledge, accept, and manage risk in context. We feel that
this is a more ﬂexible approach because it accepts the potential for all systems to
be compromised and to try to work to the best ability anyway, whilst not failing
silent (see the commandments). While we are in a position of needing security at
some level, we feel that we can enhance security both by this acceptance and by
the raising of awareness the trust relationship can eﬀect with the user.
As well as the questions above, we are working on integration of trust and comfort
reasoning into more complex settings including critical infrastructure interdepen-
dencies and management, and human-oriented processes.
6. Conclusions
Trust and Comfort are ﬂexible, awareness-enhancing approaches to risk in con-
text. They encourage ﬂexible adaptations to risk that are human oriented and seek
to enhance understanding of security in the people using them. Our work in this
area has been exploring formal models for comfort based on our extant trust models,
the integration of comfort into mobile devices, the design of comfort enabled user
interfaces, and the extension of comfort in diﬀerent infrastructures and contexts.
Of necessity, space for this paper is short. There is, however, much to say and
much to be done on the topics of Foreground Trust, Enablement, and Comfort for
security, and we hope that this short paper has shed enough light on the topic and
its considerations to interest the reader.
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